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Abstract
Feeding an additional three billion people over the next four decades, along with providing food security 
for another one billion people that are currently hungry or malnourished, is a huge challenge. Meeting those 
goals in a context of land and water scarcity, climate change, and declining crop yields will require another 
giant leap in agricultural innovation. The aim of this paper is to stimulate a dialogue on what new approaches 
might be needed to meet these needs and how innovative funding mechanisms could play a role. In particular, 
could “pull mechanisms,” where donors stimulate demand for new technologies, be a useful complement 
to traditional “push mechanisms,” where donors provide funding to increase the supply of research and 
development (R&D). With a pull mechanism, donors seek to engage the private sector, which is almost 
entirely absent today in developing country R&D for agriculture, and they pay only when specified outcomes 
are delivered and adopted.
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Three of every four poor people in developing countries live in rural 
areas…and most depend on agriculture for their livelihoods. 
World Bank, 2008 World Development Report 
Agriculture in the 21st century faces multiple challenges: it has to produce 
more food, feed and fibre for a growing population with a smaller rural 
labour force, more feedstocks for a potentially huge bioenergy market, 
contribute to overall development in agriculture-dependent developing 
countries, adopt more efficient and sustainable production methods and 
adapt to climate change. UN Food and Agricultural Organization, 2009. 
Introduction 
 
Feeding an additional three billion people over the next four decades, along with providing food 
security for another one billion people that are currently hungry or malnourished, depends on 
using every available tool to raise agricultural productivity, reduce poverty, and strengthen safety 
nets to cushion the impact of future shocks. Ensuring food security requires a range of policy 
responses, but, in the face of growing threats from land and water scarcity, climate change, and 
declining crop yields, new and improved tools to stimulate agricultural innovation and the 
adoption of new technologies are clearly needed.  
Given the scope of the challenges, reversing the decline in donor support for agriculture in poor 
countries is the first step, but donors also need to find ways to leverage the resources and harness 
the energy of the private sector. Doing the latter, however, requires the reversing the current 
situation, where agricultural R&D by the private sector is virtually nonexistent in developing 
countries because of market failures that make it difficult for them to recoup up-front costs in 
developing new products. 
This paper explores how ―pull mechanisms,‖ where funders stimulate demand for new 
technologies, could be a useful complement to traditional ―push mechanisms,‖ which provide 
funding to increase the supply of research and development (R&D). Pull mechanisms help to 
solve the information asymmetries between donors and researchers that complicate traditional 
push funding for R&D. Engaging the private sector and linking donor payments to adoption also 
encourages innovators to pay close attention to what farmers need and want. There are many 
mechanisms for engaging the private sector in innovation for developing countries, but the focus 
here is on those where donors pay only when specified outcomes are delivered and adopted. 
The encouraging news is that donor neglect of the agricultural sector in developing countries 
ended with the spike in food prices in 2008. In L’Aquila, Italy, in 2009, G-8 leaders pledged to 
provide $20 billion for agricultural development and food security in coming years. That is a 
welcome step in reversing the fall in the share of bilateral official development assistance (ODA) 2 
 
for agriculture from 17 percent in 1980 to just 4 percent in 2003. Multilateral assistance dropped 
even more (WDR 2008, Pardey et al., 2006). Within aid to agriculture, support for public 
research and development (R&D) also slowed in the 1990s and in Africa, which never really 
experienced a green revolution, public spending declined.  
The decline in public investment in agriculture was, in part, due to the fact that commodity 
prices, on average, declined for decades and many thought the food problem had been solved. 
Cyclical factors played an important role in the spike in food price in 2007-08, but the crisis also 
underscored the longer-term demand and supply factors, exacerbated by climate change, that 
could cause a reversal in the downward trend—population growth, rising incomes, biofuel 
production, growing land and water scarcity, and declining yield growth. Even in the face of 
growing needs, however, increased funding to meet these needs will only be sustained if donors 
can show that it is being used effectively.  
The plan of the paper is as follows. The first section looks at why public support for agricultural 
R&D is needed, where the gaps are, and what we can learn from where the green revolution did 
and did not succeed. The second section contrasts push mechanisms, which focus on the supply 
side of R&D, with pull mechanisms, which engage the demand side, and identifies conditions 
where pull mechanisms can be helpful in overcoming market failures. The third section presents 
a framework for assessing the potential of pull mechanisms to contribute to agricultural 
innovation needs. 
Market Failures in Innovation and in Developing Countries 
Innovation is a classic public good and market forces alone typically fail to induce a socially 
optimal level of innovative activity. This is both because innovation produces spillover benefits 
that innovators cannot fully appropriate, and because production costs are often well below the 
up-front costs of research and development. If the inventor must compete with copycats that sell 
at a price just covering production costs, and she cannot recoup those up-front investment costs 
and make a profit, then innovation will be under-supplied and society will be worse off.  
A common solution to these market failures is to grant innovating firms patents, or other forms 
of intellectual property rights (IPR), that give them a period of market exclusivity during which 
they can sell products at prices above competitive levels. Governments adopt this approach in 
many situations because, relative to direct government funding of R&D, patents allow the private 
sector to make decisions on investments guided by information from markets about what 
consumers want and are willing to pay for. The reliance on market mechanisms also opens the 
potential rewards of innovation to all and avoids the danger that incentives will be limited to 
those individuals, institutions, or ideas that may be in political favor at a given time. 
But other market failures can undermine the effectiveness of the IPR approach in some 
situations. For example, where R&D costs are high and market demand for new technologies is 
uncertain, patents may be insufficient to attract private investment. This is often the case with 3 
 
basic research, where the information generated is crucial for subsequent innovation but 
commercial applications are not immediately obvious. This is also a situation that often arises in 
developing countries that are small and poor, meaning that innovations adapted to their special 
needs may not generate sufficient profit to attract private-sector investment. The problem of 
small size is often compounded by governments that make their technology licensing decisions 
nationally rather than supranationally. 
Relative to most other sectors, agriculture presents greater challenges for inventors trying to 
appropriate the benefits of their efforts. For crops that are self-pollinating, for example, farmers 
can re-use seed from year to year, making it difficult for inventors to enforce patents and recoup 
their costs. Thus, in the United States in 2000, the private sector accounted for 72 percent of all 
R&D spending, but only 55 percent in the agriculture sector. Within agriculture, private sector 
R&D tends to focus on areas where the benefits are more easily appropriable, such as hybrid 
seeds that have to be replaced every year or two, chemical inputs, and machinery (Pardey and 
Alston 2010, pp. 6, 9).  
In areas of research where intellectual property rights are not sufficient to allow innovators to 
capture the fruits of their labor, governments often rely on direct funding of R&D to subsidize 
the development of technologies they expect to have large social returns. While this traditional 
approach is and will remain an important part of the R&D landscape, it raises other dilemmas 
related to what economists call principal-agent problems. Kremer and Zwane (2004, pp. 92-93), 
for example, note that asymmetric information is a problem between donors and researchers and 
that the incentives of donors and researchers may not be aligned. Making research grants ex ante, 
when donors have incomplete information, can lead to wasted resources if donors pick the wrong 
―winner‖ among various proposed approaches to a problem. Kremer and Zwane also point to the 
risk that R&D allocations can become politicized, again wasting resources.  
Common alternatives to public subsidies to encourage socially beneficial innovation include 
regulatory mandates and taxes or other price-based mechanisms, such as feed-in tariffs for 
renewable energy use by utilities. The focus of this paper, however, is on how public and private 
donors could complement traditional ―push mechanisms‖ with innovative, demand-based, pull 
mechanisms that pay ex post for agricultural innovations aimed at developing countries. 
Under-investment in agricultural R&D for developing countries 
If patents and other protections for intellectual property traditionally used in rich countries are 
less powerful for agriculture than for other sectors, they are even less helpful in stimulating 
innovation in developing countries. Low-income countries, even when they are added together 
(excluding China and India), constitute a market that is often too small and poor to make large 
R&D investments profitable. In African agriculture, the obstacles are even larger because there 
are many staple crops that are not demanded in significant quantities elsewhere.  4 
 
Annex table 1 shows the main sources of calories in developing country regions. Wheat, rice, 
and maize, which are also widely grown and consumed in rich countries, account for most of the 
staple grains consumed in South and East Asia. But in sub-Saharan Africa, those grains account 
for just under a third of calories consumed, on average, while sorghum and millet, along with 
starchy roots such as cassava, make up another third. Private seed companies have little incentive 
to invest significant sums in developing improved varieties for these minor crops because the 
expected market would be too small to recoup the costs. Annex table 2 tells a somewhat more 
complicated story, with maize and rice being relatively important in many parts of Africa, but 
also showing large yield gaps relative to the rest of the world, including key countries in Asia. 
The latter suggests that inattention to Africa-specific crops is not the only reason that the green 
revolution failed there, an issue to which I return in a moment. 
Given these challenges, it is no surprise that the share of private investment in total agricultural 
R&D spending in developing countries was only 2 percent in 2000 and just 5 percent of private 
R&D spending was in developing countries. Public sector spending on agricultural R&D in 
developing countries increased 50 percent from 1981 to 2000, and the developing-country share 
of the total also increased, from 38 percent of the total to 43 percent. But, these investments are 
slowing, with average annual growth rates down from 3 percent in the 1980s to just 1.9 percent 
in the 1990s, a decade when public spending in Africa declined (Bientema and Stads 2008). 
According to the UN Food and Agricultural Organization, food production will have to increase 
70 percent by 2050 to keep up with a global population expanding by 50 percent to 9 billion 
(United Nations 2009).  Given the physical and environmental constraints on increasing land and 
water use, productivity will have to increase substantially to meet the demand. Moreover, 
research suggests that investments to improve agricultural productivity make economic sense. A 
meta-survey of published rates of return on investments in agricultural R&D and extension 
services found an overall average return of over 40 percent, though the individual estimates 
varied widely. The average for investments in sub-Saharan Africa was just below the overall 
average, in the mid-30s (reported in WDR 2008, pp. 165-66). 
Lessons from the Green Revolution and the non-revolution in Africa 
Perhaps public investment in agricultural R&D declined because people thought the problem had 
been solved. The R&D-based green revolution of the 1960s and 1970s sharply raised agricultural 
productivity in Asia, but it largely bypassed Africa. Moreover, yield growth is slowing in Asia as 
well and there are growing concerns about the environmental consequences four decades into the 
green revolution. Thus the revolution needs to be renewed and adapted to reflect concerns about 
climate change, water scarcity, pollution and health threats, and lagging progress in Africa. 
In general, among the priorities for research in the face of these constraints are: 
  New farming techniques that reduce (or do not increase) carbon emissions and that 
conserve water. 5 
 
  Replacements for or improved efficiency of energy and resource-intensive fertilizers. 
  Safer pest control methods, whether chemical, biotech, or through management practices. 
  Storage and processing technologies to reduce post-harvest losses. 
In Africa, despite some progress in recent years, the adoption of improved crop varieties remains 
well below the levels in most other developing regions. Among the key reasons for this are 
(adapted from Minot 2008): 
  Different staple products that are not widely consumed outside Africa, including millet, 
sorghum, and cassava; the Green Revolution focused mostly on maize, wheat, and rice, 
which are relatively less important in Africa as staples. 
  Different agro-ecological conditions—climate, soil, and eco-zone specific weeds, pests—
mean that varieties developed elsewhere are not easily adapted for African conditions. 
  Different farming technologies that do not work as well with improved seed varieties 
o  Mostly rain-fed—only a small percentage of the land in Africa is irrigated. 
o  Low fertilizer use because of costs due to small scale, transportation. 
  Soil depletion, which makes chemical fertilizers less effective. 
  Land abundance in some areas, and weak property rights in others, lowers the incentive 
for farmers to invest in more intensive agriculture. 
  Lack of access to markets also undermines the incentive for intensification in some areas. 
Concentrated efforts to increase agricultural productivity have succeeded at some times in some 
countries in Africa, but often only with government subsidies. When those subsidies proved 
unsustainable and were withdrawn, farmers often abandoned the new technologies or methods 
and the gains were reversed. In 2009, a Norwegian university released an impact assessment, 
commissioned by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, examining whether 
farmers in Tanzania were still using technologies introduced earlier to promote food security and 
higher household incomes for smallholders. The study found that some technologies were still in 
use and some had even spread to neighboring villages, but many others had been wholly or 
partially rejected (Johnsen et al. 2009). The reasons listed in the study for rejecting new 
technologies included: 
  Did not yield benefits under unfavorable weather conditions, especially drought 
  Unavailability of an introduced technology. 
  Did not match farmers’ priorities or meet their preferences (e.g., for taste). 
  Inputs associated with technology were too expensive. 
  Increased labor requirements were not commensurate with benefit. 
And the final reason that farmers in this experiment rejected new technologies was the ―lack of 
available markets where the farmers’ products achieved attractive prices.‖  6 
 
Overall, the technologies rejected in this analysis did not meet the market test of producing 
benefits large enough to offset additional costs. That is exactly the test that demand-based, pull 
mechanisms are designed to force innovators to pass. 
 
Inducing Agricultural Innovation 
The section above discussed the reasons that traditional, IPR-based approaches have not worked 
well in stimulating agricultural innovation for developing countries. It also discussed some of the 
reasons that traditional push mechanisms, which involve donors paying ex ante to increase the 
supply of R&D, are not always as effective as they might be. For those reasons, and because the 
private sector has a lot to offer in the fight against food insecurity and rural poverty, the 
remainder of the paper focuses on pull mechanisms. A key feature of these mechanisms is that 
they aim to engage the private sector in research in developing countries where traditional IPRs 
are either weak or not valuable enough to generate interest. A second feature is that they seek to 
alleviate information asymmetries, both between donors and researchers and between researchers 
and consumers by making payments for technologies ex post, when they are adopted.
1 
The key difference between push and pull approaches is summarized in Spielman et al. (2006): 
Incentive mechanisms can be categorized as those that either reduce the costs of R&D 
and promote basic research to encourage spillovers (push mechanisms) or those that 
increase the expected returns to R&D by improving or creating favorable market 
conditions (pull mechanisms). 
Both types of mechanisms are needed and this paper does not suggest that push mechanisms 
should disappear. Public funding of basic science and early research is essential to provide 
information to other researchers that can then be developed into specific applications. There are 
also situations where ―R&D performance is observable with clear milestones and quality 
assurance‖ where push mechanisms work well (Masters 2008, p. 8). Thus, push and pull 
mechanisms should be considered complementary rather than competing approaches to 
agricultural innovation. 
Pull mechanisms are particularly useful in situations where funders and researchers do not have 
access to the same information, where it is difficult to identify the best path to an innovation and 
therefore to set benchmarks or observe the quality of the research while it is ongoing. Pull 
mechanisms generate information about what works and free donors from having to pick 
―winners‖ for research grants based on imperfect information about the best scientific approach. 
                                                       
1 Pull mechanisms aimed at engaging the private sector in innovation for developing countries are a subset of 
performance-based mechanisms for delivering foreign aid more effectively. See Savedoff (forthcoming). 7 
 
Asymmetric information between funders and researchers also makes it difficult to align 
incentives between those two groups. For example, ex ante funding may lead researchers to 
undervalue features that are important to the final consumer, especially if the researchers are 
employed in the public sector and do not anticipate private gains from an innovation. Thus, a 
number of agricultural innovations that worked well in experiments were not embraced by 
farmers in the field. In addition to the examples in the Norwegian study cited above, Kremer and 
Zwane (2004, p. 93) describe several others, including an improved variety of sweet potato that 
Ugandan farmers rejected because it was redder than the local variety. By putting the onus on 
innovators to ensure that the final product meets the needs of consumers—by linking payments 
to the level of demand—donors can partially address the asymmetric information between 
researchers and consumers and increase the prospects for broad adoption. 
Pull mechanisms can also generate competition and harness the energies and leverage the 
resources of the private sector, particularly in the development phase and in taking research to 
the market. For example, if there is sufficient competition in the market, a tax credit for electric 
vehicles incorporates market feedback into its incentive and pushes the inventor to continually 
improve the product in order to capture a larger share of the market.  
So which specific pull mechanisms might be appropriate to stimulate agricultural innovations for 
developing countries? In 2003, the Center for Global Development convened a working group 
made up of economists, public health professionals, lawyers, and pharmaceutical and biotech 
experts to analyze potential mechanisms for inducing commercial investment in vaccine 
development. A summary of the pros and cons of twelve different options analyzed by that group 
is contained in table 2.1 of their final report (Levine et al. 2005). Of those twelve, many involve 
various tweaks to existing patent systems that do not resolve the IPR challenges in developing 
countries.  
Only five of the twelve alternatives examined by the CGD working group involved donor 
funding to pull private sector investment in innovation for developing countries: advance market 
commitments; patent buyouts; prizes; proportional prizes; and best entry tournaments. Prizes and 
best entry tournaments share the weakness that they are likely to be winner-take-all, which could 
undermine broad access to and adoption of the technology if the winner has a monopoly over 
production. Winner-take-all approaches also can foster competition of a ―race to patent‖ type, 
which can result in duplication of research efforts but not post-award competition to stimulate 
pressures for continued product improvements. Patent buyouts could be helpful in situations 
where there are potential spillovers from rich country R&D, but they will not stimulate 
innovation to meet specific developing country needs. Levine et al. (2005) and Masters (2008) 
discuss the weaknesses and strengths of other approaches. 
As the CGD working group concluded with respect to vaccines, advance market commitments 
(AMC) also seem to offer significant advantages over other pull mechanisms for agricultural 
innovation, at least in some areas. By engaging the private sector, it puts ―decisions about which 8 
 
avenues to pursue and which to abandon… in the hands of those with the biggest stake and with 
the most knowledge about the prospects for success‖ (Levine et al. 2005). And by creating a 
market for a product with uncertain demand, it mobilizes additional resources for late-stage 
development and production costs, including for meeting safety, environmental, or other 
regulatory requirements that must be met before release of improved technologies. 
 
As pointed out in Masters (2008, p. 11), however, designing an AMC requires being very 
specific about the characteristics of the desired technology and that is not always possible when 
the goal is improving agricultural productivity in the real world, where there are many 
unknowns. He, therefore, recommends proportional prizes to generate information about what 
actually works in an environment as difficult and diverse as African agriculture. This approach, 
however, rewards incremental innovation, and still leaves the question of how socially beneficial 
innovations will be scaled up and brought to market more broadly. If the process reveals 
potentially profitable opportunities that the private sector had previously just missed, then firms 
may choose to invest with no further public action needed. But if there are other market failures, 
then additional public interventions may be needed. 
Both AMCs and proportional prizes free donors from having to pick winners in advance and they 
pay only for demonstrated results. As with push and pull mechanisms, these two types of pull 
mechanisms are complementary rather than competing and it is possible to imagine the two 
mechanisms being used in conjunction with one another. For example, a proportional prize might 
be used to identify innovations that produce the largest productivity gains in a particular area, 
and then, if demand is still too uncertain for the private sector to invest, an advance market 
commitment could be designed to provide incentives to scale up production and more broadly 
disseminate the results. Table 1 summarizes the advantages and risks of these two pull 
mechanisms while the following sections turn to some of the issues involved in designing a pull 
mechanism to address real world problems. 9 
 
 
Table 1 Broad comparison of proportional prizes and advance market commitments 
Advantages  Risks 
Proportional Prizes 
  Provide an incentive to the public and 
private sector to generate evidence on 
successful innovations, measured by 
both productivity improvement and 
degree of adoption. 
  Award process requires revelation of 
information on innovation that can then 
be disseminated more broadly. 
  Innovations will be adapted to local 




Useful for identifying sources of productivity 
improvement where key mechanisms unknown. 
  If the technology is patentable, access 
may depend on patent buy-out or 
compulsory licensing to ensure broad 
affordability. 
  Interventions to scale up production 
and distribution may also be needed. 
  Uncertainty regarding value of prizes 
may deter investment. 
  May reward innovations that would 
occur anyway. 
  Depending on scale, auditing and 
verification costs can be high. 
 
In the beginning, more likely to ―pull‖ 
information than new innovation. 
Advance Market Commitments 
  Create a link between product quality 
and revenues that accrue to developer. 
  Create a market for improved products 
and continual progress. 
  Ensure access to new products in both 
the short and long run. 
  Require sponsors to pay only if a desired 
product is developed 
 
Most appropriate where characteristics of 
desired technology are known and can be 
specified in contract. 
  Promises to pay must be credible. 
  Must be designed to cover 
appropriate products. 
  In agriculture, with atomistic, and in 
Africa undeveloped, markets for 




Difficult to apply where markets and 




A proportional prize, as developed by William Masters (2008), avoids the problems associated 
with winner-takes-all prizes by making rewards proportional to the measured impact of any 
successful innovation. The specific proposal by Masters was developed for sub-Saharan Africa 
and he argues that the proportional prize is particularly well-adapted for promoting innovation to 
improve agricultural productivity there for two reasons: 1) the technologies that will do the most 
to improve farm productivity often are not predictable in advance and will also often have to be 
adapted to local conditions, and 2) productivity impacts can be measured using relatively 
accessible data on outputs, inputs, prices, adoption rates, and production.
2  
In Masters’ general scheme, donors would set an overall prize amount which would then be 
divided among applicants who could compile evidence showing the impact of their innovation. 
These claims would be verified through an independent audit and the total prize amount divided 
among successful applicants according to the proportional value of the innovation. An audit by 
prize managers is required to verify the data submitted by applicants, focusing on three elements: 
  the incremental value of the productivity improvement, measured as the value of 
increased output minus the cost of increased inputs; 
  the revealed value to farmers, measured by adoption rates; and, 
  evidence that the productivity gains are attributable to the innovation through verification 
of controlled experiments in the field.  
In a specific recent proposal for Africa, he proposes a continent-wide fund of $12 million that 
would be used to reward productivity-improving innovations using any technology, wherever 
they occur, with individual rewards based on the estimated dollar value of the improvement that 
can be attributed to a particular innovation. The total prize fund would be $5 million per year 
over two years, with $2 million used to administer the prizes. The awards would be widely 
publicized with the expectation that successful innovations that could be scaled-up and adopted 
more widely—whether locally, nationally, or regionally—would attract additional investment 
and thus spread the benefits (communication with author). 
If appropriable, the scaling up investment might come from the private sector, but that could 
raise questions about access for poorer producers. Alternatively, some additional public 
intervention might be needed to ensure broad access. 
                                                       
2 Note that, in the scheme proposed by Masters, this would not be official data collected by government agencies 
that are often weak and underfunded, especially in developing countries. Rather, the data would typically be local, 
not national, and it would be generated or collected by those competing for prizes and then would be audited by 
prize administrators. 11 
 
Advance market commitments 
In situations where desirable characteristics of a new technology are known, for example a 
nutrient-fortified staple food crop or a new or improved storage technology, then an advance 
market commitment from donors, to ensure there will be a sufficiently remunerative market for 
the resulting product, can be useful. A problem in many developing countries is that potential 
purchasers are too poor, and markets too small, to provide a reasonable assurance that R&D 
costs will be recouped. A commitment by donors to pay an above-market price up to a certain 
number of units of a new product demanded by consumers reduces this risk. As discussed in 
detail in Levine et al. (2005), an AMC could be used either for an early stage product, such as a 
malaria vaccine, to spur new innovation, or at a later stage, such as with the existing 
pneumococcal vaccine initiative, to stimulate adaptation and the construction of new production 
facilities. Another key element of the AMC idea is to ensure long-term access by requiring 
suppliers to continue to supply the product at an affordable price for some period after the donor 
commitment ends. 
A key advantage of an AMC for donors is that, because it is demand-driven, donors pay only for 
innovations that are adopted and only to the degree that they succeed in the marketplace. The 
aforementioned Norwegian analysis of the factors behind adoption or rejection of agricultural 
innovations in Africa found that farmers would reject improved crops that did not have the taste 
or cooking properties of varieties with which they were familiar (Johnsen et al. 2009). Under an 
AMC, the private sector has an incentive, and the expertise, to develop a product that meets 
consumer preferences. 
How an AMC for agriculture might work in practice can be explored by examining efforts to use 
the mechanism to stimulate production of vaccines adapted to developing-country conditions and 
diseases. As with agricultural technologies, the private sector ignores those markets because they 
are too small and poor, and thus too risky, to be worth investing the large sums typically 
involved in developing new drugs. But engaging the private sector and using markets to 
stimulate innovation and product development offers important advantages over push 
mechanisms. If an AMC succeeds in stimulating competition to supply a targeted innovation, it 
can be designed so that it links payments to product quality and creates incentives for ongoing 
product improvements. 
To ensure long-term, affordable access, the vaccine model developed by the CGD working group 
entailed an up-front guarantee to pay an above-market price up to a ceiling number of doses, 
contingent on developing country demand. In return, the supplier would have to agree to 
continue supplying the product at an affordable price after AMC payments ended or be subject to 
financial penalties. The CGD working group report provides details on how contracts for a 
vaccine AMC might be structured, depending on whether the targeted innovation is in the early 
or later stages of development. 12 
 
In June 2009, a pilot AMC for pneumococcal vaccines was launched, with six donors 
committing $1.5 billion to cover the top-up price on a certain number of doses, and the Global 
Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI Alliance) committing another $1.3 billion to 
help poorer developing country governments pay their share of the vaccine cost. In this case, 
pneumococcal vaccines had already been developed for and were in wide use in developed 
countries. But they were not being offered in most developing countries because demand was too 
uncertain to justify the investments in adaptation, for example to treat different strains in 
developing countries and to incorporate heat tolerance to ensure quality in tropical climates. 
Firms were also reluctant to take on the risks of building or scaling up production to supply these 
markets. In March 2010, the first long-term supply agreements were signed with two firms, and 
estimates indicate that the pneumococcal vaccine could save as many as 7 million lives by 2030.
3 
An AMC for agriculture would involve identifying a technology that donors were confident 
would have significant social value, by improving nutrition, agricultural productivity, or other 
elements of food security. Additionally, public support would need to be able to bring the 
technology down the cost curve far enough to create a sustainable market over the long run. 
Given the paucity of private-sector involvement in agricultural R&D in many developing 
countries, it may be necessary to consider a modified AMC that would rely relatively more 
heavily than in the vaccine case on public-sector institutions or public-private partnerships at 
some points in the product development and dissemination chain. Because of the 
underdevelopment of rural markets in many poor countries, donors will also have to pay very 
careful attention to supply chain issues and the level of market development, an issue to which I 
turn now. 
Developing markets as a prerequisite for committing to markets 
There are some key differences between health and agricultural systems and markets in 
developing countries that could make an AMC relatively more challenging for agriculture.  
Among these are differences in the appropriability of returns from innovation, especially for 
many seed or agricultural techniques, and the potential for unintended consequences if markets 
are not adequately developed. These concerns seem particularly relevant in Africa. 
First, since the benefits of many agricultural innovations are particularly difficult for inventors to 
appropriate, the private sector is less involved in general than in most other sectors, as described 
above in the section describing the landscape of agricultural R&D. This is particularly true in 
Africa where 90 percent of seeds are either saved from year to year or purchased in local markets 
from other farmers (Minot et al. n.d, 54–56). Because African markets tend to be small and 
fragmented, and farm inputs and practices vary locally, investments in R&D with economies of 
scale are unlikely to be profitable. This means that there is a smaller private sector to engage 
with pull mechanisms in Africa.  
                                                       
3 See http://www.vaccineamc.org/files/AMC_ProcessSheet2009.pdf, last accessed April 28, 2010. 13 
 
In addition, the heterogeneity and informality of markets may make it difficult to judge potential 
market demand, increasing risks for investors. But that is also often a problem in pharmaceutical 
markets, particularly vaccines, where shifting priorities and government budget constraints can 
lead to large year-to-year fluctuations that can be exacerbated in markets dominated by a 
relatively small number of larger purchasers. Ensuring that products are developed that will be 
demanded in the market is one of the key benefits of the AMC mechanism, but that is 
undermined by offering a quantity, rather than just a price, guarantee to suppliers. In situations of 
very uncertain demand, donors may want to consider a minimum quantity guarantee, but that 
risks creating a product that no one wants. 
Another concern arises where the goal is improved productivity, as opposed to treating or curing 
a disease. If final markets do not function well, improved yields could result in gluts that trigger 
lower prices, often meaning lower incomes for farmers, and, ultimately, abandonment of the 
technology. In general, if innovations do not lead to increased profitability for farmers, they will 
not be sustained, if they are adopted at all. This, in turn, means that farmers must have adequate 
access to reasonably well-functioning markets for their goods. 
That, then, raises the role of governments in providing public goods, such as infrastructure, 
information, and a stable policy environment so that farmers have an incentive to invest in 
improvements to intensify production. While the paper focuses on pull mechanisms for market-
based agricultural innovation, donors may also want to look at a similar mechanism for 
delivering aid to governments that encourages them to improve public services or provide public 
goods to support the adoption of new technologies. The proposal, called cash on delivery aid, 
―enables funders and recipients to pursue mutually desired outcomes through a contract that 
specifies the results that recipients will achieve and the fixed payments that funders will provide‖ 
(Birdsall and Savedoff 2010, p. 18). COD aid shares many features with an AMC, including that 
payments are ex post and that donors are hands-off, allowing the recipient to determine the best 
way to achieve the specified goal. Some potential applications of COD aid for agriculture are 
discussed in box 1.  
 
Box 1 COD Aid for Agriculture 
The key to creating an effective cash on delivery (COD) aid program is in the selection of the 
indicator used to trigger payments. The indictor chosen should be an outcome, not an input or 
output, and it must be carefully designed to avoid creation of perverse incentives. For example, 
in the education case developed by Birdsall and Savedoff (2010), using the number of additional 
children enrolled in school was rejected because there is no assurance that either they or the 
teachers show up or that anyone learns anything. In agriculture, selecting appropriate indicators 
would take at least as many months of research and consultation as COD aid for education took, 
but a few areas where this approach might be useful can be suggested. Improvements in 14 
 
extension services to help farmers adapt and adopt new technologies is one obvious area, but the 
number of employed agents or the number of dollars expended are inputs and would not be 
appropriate indicators. More appropriate indicators might be a measure of improved soil quality 
or fewer pesticide poisonings among farmers and their families. Another area where this tool 
might be considered is the construction of roads, with an indicator being numbers of farmers 
delivering food to markets. The adoption of communications technologies, or other indicators of 
the delivery of market-supporting infrastructure, is an additional possibility. But for any pilot, 
appropriate indicators would have to be thought through very carefully to ensure that the 
incentives between donor and recipient are properly aligned. 
 
Framework for Identifying Potential Pilots for Pull Mechanisms 
Table 2 shows areas where pull mechanisms might be used to stimulate innovation in agriculture 
for developing countries. It divides the broad goals of innovation into three categories: more 
nutritious food, higher productivity, and higher post-harvest yields. The general areas in 
agriculture where innovations might be targeted are genetic improvements, whether through 
conventional breeding or biotech practices, and improved non-seed inputs or farming techniques. 
Though the table ignores the broader context of effective social and political institutions and 
public goods provision that is needed to provide an effective enabling environment for 
innovation and technology adoption, policymakers cannot. Education in effective use of new 
technologies, whether provided by private supplier networks or by public extension services, is 
also crucial to ensure sustainable adoption and safe use. 15 
 
 
Table 2 Selected Options for Using Pull Mechanisms to Stimulate Agricultural Innovation  
  Areas for Innovation to Achieve Goals 
Goals of 





  Vitamin A-enhanced 
sweet potato, rice 
  Protein-enhanced 
maize or other grain  
Fertilizers that also provide nutrients that humans can use 
 




higher, or at 
least more 
consistent, 
yields or lower 
costs) 
Varieties that are more 
resistant to drought, water 
stress, diseases, pests: 
  Drought-resistant 
maize 
  Wheat stem rust 
  Cassava mosaic virus 
More efficient (lower cost) fertilizers: 
  Lower energy-intensive nitrogen 
  More efficient production processes for phosphate; 
replacement in face of declining reserves? 
  Continuous release versions that reduce labor as well 
as other input costs 
 
Irrigation technologies appropriate for smallholders with 
no access to electricity 
 
Biocontrols for pests, disease 
 
Practices to improve productivity: 
  Soil improvements through agroforestry, mixed and 
inter-cropping (e.g., with legumes to fix nitrogen), 
fallowing, no tillage, application of organic matter 
  Other practices to improve productivity, e.g., System 
of Rice Intensification 








 Appropriate storage, processing technologies, adapted to 
energy, geographic constraints:  
  Hermetic storage containers, silos 
  Post-harvest drier 
  Micro pasteurizer 
NB:  proportional prizes could be used to reward innovations in any of these areas, with relatively more 
difficulty in some areas than others; AMCs would be difficult to apply in the development and 
dissemination of improved farming practices, or other disembodied technologies. Traditional push 
support for R&D and COD or other forms of aid may be more effective in the latter case, while also 
contributing to an overall environment that promotes innovation. 16 
 
The proportional prize mechanism as developed by Masters is technology-neutral and could be 
used for any of the technologies in the table. Moreover, Masters argues that there are economies 
of scale in managing proportional prizes and that a continent-wide prize for Africa, open to any 
innovation that improves agricultural productivity by whatever means, would be appropriate to 
lower administrative costs. But it would also be possible to experiment with a smaller trial that 
might target a particular country or area, or a particular crop or sector. The problem with 
selecting narrower targets is that the process will not reveal whether those innovations will 
deliver higher social benefits than alternative choices might. It also seems probable that 
proportional prizes could reveal information about locally improved varieties that provide 
incremental benefits in nutrition or resistance to biotic or abiotic stresses, but breakthrough 
technologies seem less likely to be developed under this approach.  
In considering candidates for an AMC in agriculture, some of the categories in Table 2 are more 
appropriate than others. Disembodied technologies that come from learning or information, for 
example with regard to agroforestry or other farming techniques for improving nutrition or 
productivity, make it particularly difficult for innovators to make a profit using a market-based 
mechanism, even with a donor subsidy in the early phases. Annex table 3 discusses some of the 
issues involved in piloting an AMC for agriculture in the other areas. It combines the six cells of 
the matrix in table 2 below into three categories—seeds, other inputs, and post-harvest 
technologies—and discusses general pros and cons of public support for innovation, as well as 
particular issues related to using an AMC approach. A few key of the issues are fleshed out here. 
Improved seed varieties are frequently mentioned in the literature as an area where innovation is 
needed and an AMC might be useful. The first question is, where is the need and potential 
benefit greatest?  Annex tables 1 and 2 show crops that are important in terms of consumption, 
and also where the largest yield gaps occur, rough indicators of need and potential benefit from 
innovation. In the poorer regions of the world, grains and starchy roots still account for nearly 
two-thirds of calories consumed and wheat, rice, and maize are important staples globally. Africa 
is an outlier in its reliance on minor crops not widely consumed outside the region. Annex table 2 
also shows Africa to be an outlier in terms of its yield gap in maize and rice, in part because 
improved varieties are far less common there than in other developing regions. 
Africa may not be best candidate for a vaccine-type AMC for seeds, however, for reasons 
discussed earlier. Different mechanisms, or adaptations of prizes, AMCs, or other mechanisms 
may be needed. One adaptation of the AMC idea that might be useful in Africa is discussed in 
Box 2. Other developing regions, particularly Asia, did widely adopt improved seed varieties 
during the green revolution and they may offer better targets for an AMC. A key question in 
these cases is whether ample research is going into raising major yield crops in rich countries, or 
whether specific problems in developing countries create specific R&D needs where public 
funds could help. Rice is an obvious candidate because of its continued importance as a staple 
food for such large numbers of poor people. Achim Dobermann from the International Rice 
Research Institute posted a comment on the CGD website indicating that the paper inspired a list 17 
 
of perhaps ten potential AMC pilots, including the development of faster cooking rice to save 
energy. He was also one of several to suggest better options for hermetic storage as an important 
need in general in the developing world. 
Box 2 Endpoint Royalties: Prize or Advance Market Commitment? 
Among the reactions to the paper posted on the CGD website was an interesting idea from Greg 
Traxler of the Gates Foundation.
4 Traxler notes that some developed countries, rather than 
relying on patents, charge farmers a fee when they sell their crop and, after identifying the seed 
variety, deliver a royalty-like payment to the developer. He suggests this scheme could be 
adapted for poorer farmers in developing countries with donors creating a fund to pay these 
―endpoint royalties,‖ based on surveys of adoption of improved varieties. This adaptation is 
needed because many poor farmers sell little if any of their crop in formal markets, making it 
difficult and expensive to collect endpoint royalties from them, nor can the fee be collected up 
front, since few farmers, at least in Africa, buy seeds in formal markets.  
Depending on specific design details, the adaptation for poorer countries could be seen as either 
a modified proportional prize or modified AMC. If the donors’ promise to pay is credible and 
investors respond, then the idea is similar to a proportional prize with payments based on 
observed market shares for different varieties (but not relative to social benefit, as in the Masters’ 
proposal). If potential seed developers are not convinced of the credibility of the fund, however, 
they might respond only if there is a legally binding contract, in which case, the idea looks more 
like a version of an AMC. Unlike the plan for the pneumococcal vaccine, however, ongoing 
donor subsidies might be necessary, at least until private seed markets develop further in Africa. 
This is an interesting idea that is worth exploring in more depth in future research. 
With respect to improved inputs, more efficient and effective fertilizers and irrigation 
technologies that can be sustainably produced and used are critical needs. A key question for 
fertilizers is whether the R&D being done for developed-country markets would be likely to spill 
over to developing countries, or whether additional effort is needed to create or adapt products 
for poorer markets. Africa, again, poses particular challenges, including the need to improve soil 
quality and infrastructure so that fertilizers are cost-effective.  
With respect to pest and disease control, safer chemicals are one of several options, but there are 
others. Several participants in CGD’s online consultation mentioned the problem of aflatoxin-
producing fungi infecting grains and other crops. In addition to negative health effects from 
consuming tainted crops, commentators noted that aflatoxin levels in African crops often exceed 
international regulatory standards and thus block exports. Bandyopadhyay Ranajit from the 
International Institute of Tropical Agriculture in Nigeria noted that there is an aflatoxin 
biocontrol product that has been developed and used in the United States and other countries and 
                                                       
4 Comment submitted on the CGD website, April 20 and subsequent private communications. All comments remain 
available at http://www.cgdev.org/section/topics/food_and_agriculture/incentivesforaginnovation. 18 
 
that could be adapted for Africa with donor support, similar to the AMC for the pneumococcal 
vaccine. 
Finally, several public and private comments referred to the need for post-harvest storage and 
processing technologies to improve post-harvest yields. Many of these technologies are relatively 
simple to produce and use and the major needs are in dissemination and training in their proper 
use. In addition, sustainable innovations would need to take into account the lack of electricity in 
rural areas in most developing countries. 
In terms of the pilot design for an agricultural pull mechanism, three general questions emerge: 
  Can a sustainable market be created given political, institutional, and other constraints? 
Would the benefits of the new technology be large enough, or can economies of scale 
from a market commitment bring down costs enough, to make adoption sustainable once 
subsidies are removed? If not, are ongoing subsidies or other public policies to 
supplement the pull mechanism in addressing market failures feasible? 
  Is investment needed in early-stage innovation, or for adaption and dissemination of 
existing technologies? For example, treadle pumps exist and work well in some places so 
is the need for further innovation or dissemination of that product? Should the pull 
mechanism focus on research and development, or mainly on how to scale up production 
and pull the technology down the cost curve? 
  Are supply chains and other market institutions in place to facilitate adoption, and to 
avoid localized gluts? Can incentives for private-sector advisory and training services to 
ensure safe and effective use of new technologies be built into the contract? 
Going Forward 
The needs in developing agriculture and promoting food security are great and a variety of tools 
are needed. Pull mechanisms are particularly useful to engage a largely absent private sector in 
innovative activities in this area. In selecting potential pilots to support, donors need to, first, 
determine the regional and functional areas of interest and then determine the appropriate tool to 
fit. A vaccine-style AMC for agriculture may not work as well in Africa as in other regions, but 
adaptations of the idea using public-private partnerships may be useful, along with the 
proportional prize idea to incentivize innovations that are well adapted to local conditions. An 
AMC for improved rice varieties could potentially improve food security for billions in Asia, 
while more effective storage technologies could do that around the world. 
The next steps in creating a proportional prize fund to stimulate agricultural innovation and 
adoption are relatively simple, if one follows the Masters model, but the process for selecting a 
potential AMC pilot is more complicated. With a proportional prize fund, the key decisions 
involve the geographic and sectoral scope of the initiative. 19 
 
With respect to an AMC pilot, donors must first decide which goal of innovation they want to 
pursue—improved nutrition, productivity, or post-harvest yields—and then which general area of 
agricultural innovation will be the focus—improved varieties or inputs (including post-harvest 
activities).  The paper has tried to identify some of the technologies where an AMC approach 
might be appropriate, but donors will have to choose among those, based on relative need, 
balanced against budget constraints. Unless there is a consensus choice, picking a pilot candidate 
would require a more systematic consultation process than was possible for this paper, involving 
potential donors and other stakeholders including private firms, developing-country 
governments, farmers’ associations, and other civil society groups. Once a category of 
technologies is chosen, further extensive discussions would be needed to determine the specifics 
of the desired technology, as well as contract details, such as price and the amount of donor 
subsidy. GAVI’s AMC website has a timeline showing the years of work and engagement 
needed to bring the pneumococcal vaccine (nearly) to fruition.
5 No less effort would be required 
for an agricultural AMC, but the potential pay-off is large as well. 
 
                                                       
5 http://www.vaccineamc.org/pilot_timeline.html, last accessed June 2, 2010. 20 
 
 
Annex Table 1  Sources of Daily Calories in Developing Countries 
                 
  Sub-Saharan Africa  Latin America, 
Caribbean 
South Asia  East, SE Asia 








































                 
Cereals, starchy roots  66  21  40  31  63  2  64  25 
  Wheat  7  77  13  62  21  3  6  105 
  Rice  8  42  9  16  35  --  49  5 
  Maize  15  9  14  18  2  2  5  38 
  Sorghum, millet  14  1  --  33  3  --  --  -- 
  Starchy roots  20  --  4  2  2  --  4  6 
                 
Other vegetable 
products 
28    40    29    27   
Animal products  6    20    8    9   
                 
-- =negligible 
Source:  UN Food and Agriculture Organization, FAOSTAT database. 
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Annex Table 2 Indicators of Innovations Needs in Selected Regions and Countries 
         
    Area Harvested  Share of total calories  Yield Gap  
      (hectares)  consumed(percent)  (relative to ROW, %)* 
Eastern Africa  Maize  13,550,985  24.2  320 
  Sorghum  4,293,998  4.6  40 
  Cassava  2,907,865  9.0  46 
  Rice  2,381,748  6.6  107 
   Wheat  1,743,522  9.0  77 
Central Africa  Cassava  3,354,691  32.1  60 
  Maize  3,475,522  12.5  495 
  Wheat  14,102  6.6  97 
  Rice  610,999  4.5  340 
  Sorghum  1,482,675  3.6  78 
   Millet  1,422,174  2.4  75 
Southern Africa**  Maize  3,080,409  31.4  34 
  Wheat  782,320  17.1  4 
   Rice  1,450  5.3  85 
Western Africa  Rice  5,773,673  12.4  148 
  Sorghum  14,861,350  10.5  77 
  Millet  16,818,968  10.3  -9 
  Cassava  5,720,437  9.8  17 
  Maize  7,973,242  8.9  200 
   Wheat  43,514  5.3  78 
China  Rice  29,493,292  27.0  -42 
   Wheat  23,617,075  20.5  -39 
India  Rice  44,000,000  30.0  39 
  Wheat  28,038,600  20.1  12 
  Millet  11,997,600  3.0  1 
   Sorghum  7,764,000  2.1  52 
Indonesia  Rice  12,309,155  50.5  -13 
  Maize  4,003,313  7.5  26 
  Wheat  0  6.1  N/A 
   Cassava  1,193,319  4.6  -33 
Vietnam  Rice  7,414,300  60.2  -18 
  Wheat  0  3.7  N/A 
   Maize  1,125,900  2.6  27 
* Minus sign indicates local yields higher than the rest of world (ROW) average. 
** Excluding South Africa.       




Annex Table 3: Issues Involved in Choosing a Pilot AMC 








  Hybrids 
 
 





  Open-pollinated varieties 
Improved varieties typically work best in conjunction 
with adequate water, other inputs 
 
In Africa, seed, input markets not well-developed, and 
most acreage rain-fed; ~90 percent of seeds obtained 
through farmer saved seeds or local markets 
 
Yields drop sharply in short time and must be replaced; 
constraints above limit adoption of improved hybrid 
varieties in SSA 
 
GM subject to similar constraints, unless a OPV; also 
constrained in SSA by regulatory environment and fear 
of export losses in EU due to opposition to GM 
 
Seeds can be saved, making them more affordable for 
farmers but less lucrative for seed companies 
Africa:  an AMC aimed at engaging the private sector 
in development and dissemination of improved 
varieties may not be feasible because of extensive use 
of minor crops, and under-development of markets 
on both the supply and demand sides. A modified 
AMC might be used to create or adapt production and 
distribution channels to market products developed 
in public institutions or through public-private 
partnerships, which are active in many areas. 
 
Elsewhere:  maize is a major staple but it is also a 
major crop in developed countries  improved varieties 
are mostly hybrids where the benefits are more easily 
appropriated by the innovator. Wheat and rice are 
also important developing-country staples that are 
also major crops in developed countries. Drought, 
and many (though not all) disease threats are 
common, so substantial private and public research is 
already going into improvements in these crops. 
 
A form of AMC might be appropriate: 
  For nutrient-fortification in countries with 
widespread malnutrition deficiencies 
  Where  varieties being improved for developed-
country markets need to be adapted for local 
conditions or pests 
  For improved varieties of rice, since such a large 




Markets often not well-developed and knowledge 
needed for effective application often lacking 
 
Africa: until infrastructure and markets are 
developed, the focus might be better placed on 
improved farming practices than on chemical inputs, 23 
 




  Pest, disease controls 
 
 
  Irrigation 
 
In SSA, in particular, often uneconomic because of high 
transportation costs; also less effective in already 
depleted soils, as in much of SSA 
 
Affordability; also need to be adapted to low literacy 
levels to protect health and safety 
 
Appropriate technology depends on local conditions; 
provisions for maintenance critical 
 
especially given the problem of soil depletion, and, 
for that, traditional push or COD aid to improve 
extensions services might be a better approach than 
an AMC 
 
Elsewhere: clear needs for more efficient, less 
energy-intensive fertilizers and safer pesticides, 
herbicides, or organic techniques. These needs also 
exist in developed countries, however, so the 
question in designing an AMC would to be to identify 
the particular constraints limiting innovation or 
dissemination in developing countries. Two issues 
relevant for developing countries are labor 
abundance (in some areas) and illiteracy, which could 
suggest adaptations that are relatively more cost-
effective, or safer, in developing countries specifically. 
 
For both: sustainable irrigation technologies adapted 
to developing-country conditions to mitigate 
increased volatility in weather with climate change. 
Post-harvest technologies 








Would be helpful both for subsistence smallholders, 
allowing them to smooth consumption over the 
seasons, and for more commercially-oriented farmers; 
would allow both to earn more from crops by not 
having to sell immediately after harvest. 
 
Similar benefits, plus allowing farmer to earn additional 
income from value-added processing. 
 
Constraints on both, especially in SSA, from limited or 
no access to reliable energy. 
 
An AMC would be appropriate, either to develop or 
adapt and disseminate storage or processing 
technologies. Key features will be scale—adapted to 





Beintema, N.M. and G-J Stads, 2008. Agricultural R&D Capacity and Investments in the Asia-
Pacific Region, Research Brief No. 11, International Food Policy Research Institute, 
Washington. 
Birdsall, Nancy, William Savedoff, Katherine Vyborny, and Ayah Mahgoub, 2010. Cash on 
Delivery: A New Approach to Foreign Aid With an Application to Primary Schooling.  Center 
for Global Development, Washington. 
Johnsen, Fred H., Dismas L. Mwaseba, and Felister M. Mombo. 2009. Farmer perspectives on 
the usefulness of technologies introduced by on-farm research: The case of the TARPII-SUA 
programme.  Noragric Report No. 50. Aas, Norway: Department of International Environment 
and Development Studies, Norwegian University of Life Sciences. 
Kremer, Michael, and Alix Peterson Zwane. 2004. ―Encouraging Private Sector Research for 
Tropical Agriculture.‖ World Development, vol. 33, no. 1:  pp. 87–105. 
Levine R, Kremer M, Albright A. 2005. ―Making Markets for Vaccines.‖ Working Group 
Report. Center for Global Development, Washington.  
Masters, W.A. and Delbecq, B. (2008). Accelerating innovation with prize rewards. Discussion 
Paper 835. International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington. 
Minot, Nicholas, 2008. "Promoting a strong seed sector in Sub-Saharan Africa:," Policy briefs 6, 
International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington. 
Minot, Nicholas, et al. (no date). ―Seed development programs in sub-Saharan Africa.‖ 
International Food Policy Research Institute (Washington) unpublished. 
Pardey, P.G., and N.M. Beintema, et al. 2006. Agricultural Research: A Growing Global Divide? 
IFPRI Food Policy Report. International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington. 
Pardey, P.G., and J. M. Alston.  2010. U.S. Agricultural Research in a Global Food Security 
Setting.  Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington. 
Savedoff, William D. 2010. ―Incentives in the Service of Development.‖ CGD Working Paper.  
Center for Global Development, forthcoming, Washington. 
Smale, Melinda and Timothy M. Mahoney, 2010.  Agricultural Productivity in Changing Rural 
Worlds.  Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington. 
Spielman, David, Anwar Naseem, and Steven Were Omamo. 2006. The Private Sector in 
Agricultural R&D. ISNAR Discussion Paper. International Food Policy Research Institute, 
Washington. 25 
 
UN Food and Agricultural Organization. 2009. How to Feed the World in 2050.  Rome. 
World Bank. 2008. World Development Report: Agriculture for Development. Washington. 